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Mass Criminalization and Racial Disparities in
Conviction Rates
ERIN E. MEYERS†
A staggering number of Americans experience criminal justice contact each year, ranging from
arrest to long-term incarceration. One 2014 Wall Street Journal report estimated that
approximately one in three Americans are represented in the FBI’s master criminal database.
Many scholars and commentators have questioned the desirability of mass criminalization and
the resulting large-scale arrests.
I add new empirical context to this ongoing discussion by examining conviction rates among a
nationally representative sample of young men. I find that, conditional on having been arrested,
Black men are 29% less likely than their similarly situated White counterparts to experience
conviction. This result may come as a surprise, given that existing research shows that Black men
experience worse outcomes at the arrest and sentencing stages of criminal justice processing.
Upon further examination, the result makes sense in the context of selection effects. Supplemental
analyses show that the lower conviction rate of Black men is likely driven by over-arrest (i.e., that
police are likely to use discretion in arrest decisions in a discriminatory manner). This apparent
disconnect between policing decisions and prosecutorial screening raises serious questions of the
validity and desirability of arresting so many Black men each year.
My empirical analysis further suggests that more than 50% of Black men have been arrested by
young adulthood. Each arrest is psychologically and financially costly to the arrestee, cultivates
lasting stigma directed at the arrestee, limits the arrestee’s future labor market opportunities,
costs taxpayer money in the form of policing budgets, and increases the likelihood of police
violence. My results highlight the distributional costs of mass criminalization—often borne by
Black individuals—and add context to the discussion of whether the costs of large-scale arrests
exceed their benefits.

† J.D./Ph.D., Program in Law and Economics, Vanderbilt Law School, 2021. eemeyers29@gmail.com.
I am grateful to my dissertation committee, the faculty at Vanderbilt Law School, and students in the Law and
Economics program for reading countless drafts of this piece and providing excellent guidance. Many thanks to
the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their assistance in preparing this piece for publication.
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INTRODUCTION
Factors affecting criminal justice outcomes can be categorized as either
warranted (i.e., legally relevant and related to criminal involvement) or
unwarranted (i.e., legally irrelevant characteristics of an individual). 1 In a
perfectly fair criminal system, outcomes would be based solely on warranted
factors. However, very few—if any—social systems operate in a perfectly fair
manner.
Many studies investigate whether race acts as an unwarranted factor that
affects criminal justice outcomes. Arrest statistics consistently show racial
differences in arrests that disfavor the Black population. For instance, Black
individuals made up approximately 12.7% of the U.S. population in 2018 but
27.4% of the arrests that year.2 Statistics such as these are sometimes cited to
support the proposition that Black individuals are more likely to commit crimes
than White individuals.3 However, this characterization grossly oversimplifies
the criminal justice process.4 Indeed, differing criminal behavior by race is only
one of multiple possible explanations that could underlie arrest rate disparities.
Most research on racial disparities in criminal justice processing focuses
on the endpoints of arrest and sentencing, with far less attention paid to the
middle stages of charging and conviction.5 We know from existing data and
empirical research that Black individuals are more likely to be arrested and
receive harsher sentences than their White counterparts, even after controlling
for self-reported criminal behavior and other legally relevant factors.6 By

1. Lauren Nichol Gase, Beth A. Glenn, Louis M. Gomez, Tony Kuo, Moira Inkelas & Ninez A. Ponce,
Understanding Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest: The Role of Individual, Home, School, and Community
Characteristics, 8 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 296, 297 (2016); Cydney Schleiden, Kristy L. Soloski, Kaitlyn Milstead
& Abby Rhynehart, Racial Disparities in Arrests: A Race Specific Model Explaining Arrest Rates Across Black
and White Young Adults, 37 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 1, 2–3 (2020).
2. Table 43: Arrests by Race and Ethnicity, 2018, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/tables/table-43 (last visited Apr.
15, 2022); ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/
cedsci/table?d=ACS%205-Year%20Estimates%20Data%20Profiles&tid=ACSDP5Y2018.DP05 (last visited
Apr. 15, 2022).
3. See, e.g., Legendary Diogenes, Black vs. White Crime Statistics, WHITE PRIVILEGE ISN’T REAL (Feb.
8, 2022), https://whiteprivilegeisntreal.org/black-vs-white-crime-statistics/#gref (using arrest statistics for
violent crime to support the proposition that Black individuals commit more violent crime than White
individuals).
4. See Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Introduction: Mapping the New Criminal Justice
Thinking, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 8–9 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017)
(“American culture has so long associated criminality with blackness and continues to do so, even though the
racial makeup of the criminalized population is itself a result of law enforcement selection and prosecution
policies.”).
5. See discussion infra Part II.A (summarizing research on racial disparities in arrests); see also discussion
infra Part II.B (summarizing research on racial disparities in convictions).
6. For examples of research on racial disparities in arrest, see generally Tia Stevens Andersen, Race,
Ethnicity, and Structural Variations in Youth Risk of Arrest: Evidence from a National Longitudinal Sample, 42
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 900 (2015); Gase et al., supra note 1; Schleiden et al., supra note 1. For examples of
research on racial disparities in sentencing, see generally Jill K. Doerner & Stephen Demuth, The Independent
and Joint Effects of Race/Ethnicity, Gender, and Age on Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts, 27 JUST.
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focusing on the endpoints of arrest and sentencing, existing research has left a
gap in understanding the role that race plays at the charging and conviction
stages. Indeed, many scholars have noted and expressed concerns about the lack
of empirical research on middle stages of criminal justice processing, such as
prosecutorial screening, charging decisions, pretrial detention, and conviction
rates.7
Some recent research has attempted to fill this gap by examining racial
differences in prosecutors’ decisions to dismiss charges.8 However, these studies
have yielded conflicting results,9 and the relationship between race and charging
and conviction rates is an open question.
Two Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations highlight the uncertain
nature of racial disparities in conviction rates. A DOJ investigation of the
Baltimore, Maryland police department found equal case dismissal rates by race
for serious offenses, but a higher rate of case dismissals for Black individuals
for crimes where police officers had wide discretion to make arrests.10 The DOJ
posited that this finding indicates that Baltimore police use their discretion in a
racially discriminatory manner.11 In contrast, another DOJ investigation of the
Ferguson, Missouri police department found a higher rate of overall case
dismissal for White individuals compared to Black individuals.12 Thus,

Q. 1 (2010); Ronald S. Everett & Roger A. Wojtkiewicz, Difference, Disparity, and Race/Ethnic Bias in Federal
Sentencing, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 189 (2002); Theodore R. Curry & Guadalupe Corral-Camacho,
Sentencing Young Minority Males for Drug Offenses: Testing for Conditional Effects Between Race/Ethnicity,
Gender and Age During the US War on Drugs, 10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 253; Joshua B. Fischman & Max M.
Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion
and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 729 (2012); Traci Schlesinger, The Cumulative Effects
of Racial Disparities in Criminal Processing, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUDS. 261 (2007).
7. See Eric P. Baumer, Reassessing and Redirecting Research on Race and Sentencing, 30 JUST. Q. 231,
240 (2013).
8. While not the focus of this Article, another subset of this research is more granular and examines results
such as procedural outcomes (for example, differences in pretrial detention by race) and the types of crimes an
individual is charged with or convicted of (for example, differences in charging crimes associated with
mandatory minimums by race). Many studies in this line of research find outcomes disfavoring black arrestees
at these stages. See sources cited infra notes 16–18.
9. See, e.g., Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 1187, 1190–91 (2018) (finding a lower likelihood of dropped or reduced charges for Black individuals
compared to White individuals); Travis W. Franklin, Community Influence on Prosecutorial Dismissals: A
Multilevel Analysis of Case- and County-Level Factors, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 693, 699 (2010) (observing mixed
findings); Besiki L. Kutateladze, Nancy R. Andiloro, Brian D. Johnson & Cassia C. Spohn, Cumulative
Disadvantage: Examining Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Prosecution and Sentencing, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 514,
531 (2014) (finding a higher likelihood of dropped charges for Black and Latino individuals compared to White
individuals); Aleksandar Tomic & Jahn K. Hakes, Case Dismissed: Police Discretion and Racial Differences in
Dismissals of Felony Charges, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 110, 135 (2008) (observing mixed findings).
10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. RTS. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 64
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [hereinafter BALTIMORE POLICE I NVESTIGATION];
Amanda D’Souza, Ronald Weitzer & Rod K. Brunson, Federal Investigations of Police Misconduct: A MultiCity Comparison, 71 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 461, 468–69 (2019).
11. BALTIMORE POLICE INVESTIGATION, supra note 10, at 64.
12. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. RTS. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 69
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_
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answering the question of what role race plays in conviction appears to vary
significantly by jurisdiction and crime type.
This variation across jurisdictions indicates that a nationally representative
dataset can be useful in gaining a picture of the average racial disparity in
conviction rates across the United States. I use the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth – 1997 (NLSY97) to examine racial disparities in charging and
conviction rates of adult, male respondents.
My analysis adds to empirical research on charging and conviction rates in
four ways. First, prior studies examining charging and conviction rates use
administrative datasets, rather than longitudinal surveys.13 While administrative
datasets have detailed procedural data that the NLSY97 lacks, they contain very
limited data on the characteristics of arrested individuals.14 Scholars have noted
that the lack of information in administrative datasets on characteristics such as
socioeconomic status and marital status make it difficult to draw strong
conclusions about race effects in studies of criminal justice processing. 15
The NLSY97, in contrast, contains rich individual data and allows me to
isolate the relationship between race and conviction by controlling for
respondents’ education, work experience, financial wellbeing, self-reported
criminal behavior, drug use, and arrest history. I use this information to perform
regression analyses on the likelihood an individual arrestee is convicted, while
controlling for all these characteristics, along with race/ethnicity. By doing so, I
can isolate the relationship between race/ethnicity and conviction, independent
of these other individual characteristics.16
Second, the NLSY97 contains data on arrests that do not result in any
charges.17 In contrast, prior studies using administrative data contain only postcharging data.18 To the extent prosecutors use charging as a meaningful

department_report.pdf [hereinafter FERGUSON POLICE INVESTIGATION]; D’Souza et al., supra note 10, at 468–
69.
13. See Berdejó, supra note 9, at 1204–05 (public records of the Wisconsin Circuit Courts); Franklin, supra
note 9, at 695 (State Court Processing Statistics); Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 522 (DANY court data);
Tomic & Hakes, supra note 9, at 123 (State Court Processing Statistics).
14. See, e.g., Dana DeHart & Cheri Shapiro, Integrated Administrative Data & Criminal Justice Research,
42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 255, 260–261 (2017).
15. To illustrate, socioeconomic status is strongly correlated with race, and it is nearly impossible to
determine whether racial disparities in criminal justice outcomes are driven by race or socioeconomic status
when using data that do not include a measure of socioeconomic status. See Baumer, supra note 7, at 245.
Baumer also notes that lack of information on things such as evidence quality and victim characteristics make it
hard to draw strong conclusions. Id. While the NLSY97 does not contain this information, I perform additional
analysis that seeks to sort through the interaction between race, victim characteristics, and strength of evidence
as they relate to conviction rates.
16. “One of the most useful aspects of the multiple regression model is its ability to identify the independent
effects of a set of variables on a dependent variable.” WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 10 (6th ed.
2008).
17. See infra Part III (describing that NLSY97 survey respondents are asked about all arrests they
experience).
18. See Berdejó, supra note 9, at 1205 (“The analyses presented later in the Article restrict the sample to
cases filed and adjudicated in Dane County.”) (emphasis added); Franklin, supra note 9, at 695 (“Information
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screening mechanism, prior studies miss any racial/ethnic differences in arrestee
processing that occur at the charging stage.
Third, the NLSY97 contains nationally representative data that reflect
arrests for all crime types.19 In contrast, prior studies have been limited to either
specific jurisdictions or specific crime types.20 The NLSY97 allows me to
provide a broad picture of national conviction rate disparities reflecting all crime
types, rather than a snapshot of specific locales or limited crimes.
Finally, given that prior research on racial disparities of charging and
conviction has yielded mixed results,21 I discuss sample differences that may
account for the variation. In doing so, I attempt to provide a more robust theory
on the relationship between race and charging and conviction, on average, at the
national level.
For reasons discussed later, I combine the outcomes of charging and
conviction for my main analysis.22 Thus, my outcome of interest is the
probability an individual is convicted, conditional on having been arrested.
Additionally, I examine racial disparities in arrest and sentencing rates to
confirm my analysis aligns with previous studies’ finding of worse outcomes for
Black individuals at those stages.23
I find that Black men are convicted at significantly lower rates than White
men, even after controlling for other potentially relevant individual
characteristics, such as education, work experience, financial wellbeing, selfreported criminal behavior, drug use, and arrest history. My regression analyses
indicate that a Black male arrestee is approximately 29% less likely to be
convicted than a similarly situated White male arrestee.24 Some results indicate
that Hispanic arrestees are less likely to be convicted than their White
counterparts, but these results are less consistent and limited to the charging
stage. Because the results on the relationship between Hispanic ethnicity and
charging and conviction rates are less robust, this Article focuses on the
conviction disparity between Black and White arrestees.

provided by the 1998 SCPS was based on felony cases filed in thirty-nine of the nation’s seventy-five largest
counties.”) (emphasis added); Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 522 (“The data consist of 159,206
misdemeanors and 26,069 felonies accepted for prosecution . . .”) (emphasis added); Tomic & Hakes, supra
note 9, at 123 (“The file contains 72,602 observations on felony defendants in fifty-four of the nation’s seventyfive most populous counties.”) (emphasis added).
19. See Crime, Delinquency & Arrest, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., NAT’L LONGITUDINAL SURVS.,
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97/topical-guide/crime/crime-delinquency-arrest (last visited Apr.
15, 2022).
20. See sources cited infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
21. See sources cited supra note 9 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See sources cited supra note 6.
24. It is worth noting the difference between percent and percentage points. The regression analysis
presented in Appendix Table B.I shows that Black arrestees are 15.7 percentage points less likely to be convicted
than White arrestees. Given that the baseline conviction rate for White arrestees is approximately 54%, the 15.7
percentage point lower conviction rate translates to a conviction rate that is 29% lower than the white conviction
rate (calculated as 15.7 / 54).
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I consider four possible explanations for the racial disparity. First—and
what I ultimately conclude is the most likely explanation—the disparity could
reflect the systemic over-arrest of Black men (i.e., that police officers use
discretion in the arrest decision in a racially discriminatory manner). Second, the
disparity could reflect victim and witness characteristics in combination with the
intraracial nature of crime. It is possible that prosecutors exhibit racial bias
against Black victims and pursue their cases less vigorously, or that there is
general mistrust of the police among the Black community and, thus, Black
victims or witnesses are less likely to cooperate in police investigations. Both
possibilities would lead to a lower conviction rate for Black arrestees. Third, it
may be that more Black arrestees are already on probation or parole than White
arrestees at the time of arrest and, as a result, prosecutors decide to revoke
probation or parole rather than pursuing charges or a conviction. Fourth and
finally, it is theoretically possible that prosecutors exhibit racial bias against nonBlack arrestees in terms of filing charges or fully pursuing a conviction.
I investigate each of these possibilities and find that the most likely
explanation is systemic over-arrest. At the outset, I argue that racial bias against
non-Black arrestees is highly unlikely. Researchers have found consistent
evidence of unexplained disparities against Black individuals at nearly all other
points of criminal justice processing.25 Some researchers have even examined
outcomes under the discretion of the prosecutor—such as pretrial detention,26
the decision of whether to bring charges with a mandatory minimum,27 or charge
reduction28—and found evidence of unexplained racial disparities reflecting
worse outcomes for Black arrestees at these stages. It is unlikely that the decision
to not charge an arrestee or later drop the charge is the sole stage in which racial
bias appears in favor of Black individuals.
To determine whether differing rates of probation or parole could be
driving the results, I perform a supplemental analysis that uses data on
respondents’ first arrest only.29 I find that a large conviction disparity persists in
these first-time arrests, with Black arrestees being 30% less likely to be
convicted than White arrestees. Given that individuals arrested for the first time
are not already on probation or parole, this finding suggests that the disparity is
not driven by differences in rates of probation or parole across race.
To determine which of the two remaining mechanisms—over-arrest or
victim/witness differences—is most likely, I look to see whether there are

25. See sources cited supra note 6.
26. See, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE, VANESSA LYNN & EDWARD LIANG, DO RACE AND ETHNICITY
MATTER IN PROSECUTION?: A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 11 (2012) (summarizing empirical research
finding that Black and Hispanic defendants were treated harsher in the decision on pretrial release).
27. See, e.g., M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J.
POL. ECON. 1320, 1323 (2014).
28. See, e.g., Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining
Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 394, 415 (2010).
29. This sample also excludes anyone who was arrested as a juvenile.
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differences in conviction rates by type of crime. For those individuals who are
charged with a crime, the NLSY97 has data on the type of crime charged. I split
crimes into two categories, following methodology used by Tomic and Hakes in
their 2008 article.30 The first includes drug possession, drug sales, public
disorder, and major traffic offenses. This category comprises the crime types for
which police are likely to have high levels of on-the-spot discretion in the arrest
decision.31 The second category includes assault, burglary, robbery, theft,
destruction of property, and other property crimes. Arrests for these crimes are
less likely to involve on-the-spot police decision-making.32 The first category
also generally includes “victimless” crimes, while the second category of crimes
generally involves a victim.
To the extent racially biased policing and over-arrest drive lower
conviction rates, one would expect to see the disparities concentrated among
crimes for which police have greater discretion in the arrest decision. To the
extent victim and witness cooperation or prosecutor bias against non-White
victims drive lower conviction rates, the disparity would likely arise in the
second category of crimes that generally involve victims. I find that the disparity
is heavily concentrated in the first category of crimes, with no statistically
significant difference in conviction rates among those charged with the second
category of crimes. Given this pattern, I propose that racial disparities in
conviction rates are driven by systemic over-arrest of Black men for crimes in
which police have large discretion in the arrest decision.
Previous research finds that Black men are arrested at rates that exceed any
difference in self-reported criminality and other relevant factors.33 By looking
to post-arrest outcomes, my analysis provides additional evidence of over-arrest
of Black men. To the extent that convictions reflect prosecutors’ determinations
that an arrest is (1) based on sound evidence and (2) for the type of crime that is
worth expending resources to prosecute, the large difference between Black and
White men’s conviction rates raises serious questions of the validity and
desirability of arresting so many Black men each year.
If arrests were costless, my findings would be positive, at best, and
unimportant, at worst. My findings indicate that prosecutors are, to some extent,
correcting for the over-arrest of Black men, which some might interpret as
indicative of a fair legal system. However, arrests are far from costless. Policing
is costly, and many would consider undertaking many arrests that are ultimately
not fully prosecuted to be a large waste of tax dollars.34 One 2014 Wall Street

30. See Tomic & Hakes, supra note 9, at 127–28.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See sources cited infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
34. See Criminal Justice Expenditures: Police, Corrections, and Courts, URB. INST.,
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-localbackgrounders/criminal-justice-police-corrections-courts-expenditures (last visited Apr. 15, 2022) (showing that
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Journal report estimated that approximately one in three Americans are
represented in the FBI’s master criminal database.35 Further, my findings show
that current policing practices result in more than half of Black men being
arrested at least once by young adulthood. Arrests can cause immediate harm to
the arrested individual in terms of job loss, financial costs, and psychological
stress.36 Arrest records can further close doors to future opportunity in education
and the labor market.37 Large-scale arrests of Black men also cultivate stigma,
leading to misperceptions about criminality as well as distrust of police among
the Black community.38 Further, the more stops and arrests occur, the higher the
likelihood of police violence.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins by reviewing prior research
on racial disparities in arrest. Given that individuals who are charged or
convicted are a subset of those arrested, it is important to first discuss issues that
arise at the arrest stage. Part I then turns to drivers of charging and conviction
outcomes and discusses potential mechanisms through which a lower conviction
rate of Black arrestees may arise. Part II summarizes prior empirical research on
the middle criminal justice stages of charging and conviction. Part III describes
the data I use in my analysis. Part IV presents both my main results and
supplemental analyses that seek to determine the mechanism driving the lower
conviction rates for Black men. These supplemental analyses ultimately suggest
that over-arrest of Black men drives the disparity. Part V seeks to reconcile my
results with prior researchers’ mixed findings and discusses the implications of
my results. This Article then briefly concludes, and an Appendix provides the
details of my empirical analysis.
I. BACKGROUND
My analysis focuses on conviction rates of male, adult arrestees. Empirical
research on criminal justice outcomes is often split along the lines of age and
gender.39 Because the adult criminal justice system differs significantly from the

the policing budget as a percent of the overall budget was 6% for local governments, 13% for city governments,
8% for county governments, and 10% for township governments in 2017).
35. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last
a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-riseamericans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 (“[T]he FBI currently has 77.7 million
individuals on file in its master criminal database—or nearly one out of every three American adults.”).
36. See Mark Theoharis, How a Criminal Record Affects Your Finances & Your Life, MONEY CRASHERS,
https://www.moneycrashers.com/criminal-record-affects-finances-life (last updated Sept. 14, 2021).
37. See Benjamin D. Geffen, The Collateral Consequences of Acquittal: Employment Discrimination on
the Basis of Arrests Without Convictions, 20 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 81, 81 (2017).
38. See Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Gender, Race, and Urban Policing: The Experience of African
American Youths, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 531, 533 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Tia Stevens & Merry Morash, Race/Ethnic Disparities in Boys’ Probability of Arrest and
Court Actions in 1980 and 2000: The Disproportionate Impact of “Getting Tough” on Crime, 13 YOUTH
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 77 (2015).
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juvenile justice system in both its goals and processes,40 researchers generally
do not analyze them together.41 Similarly, men are often studied separately from
women, as their offending and arrest patterns vary drastically from one
another.42 Thus, for example, a single study might focus specifically on
sentencing decisions for juvenile boys.43
In general, men’s criminal justice outcomes are studied more often than
women’s because they make up most of the criminal-justice-involved
population. For instance, men made up 72.8% of arrests in 2018. 44 The NLSY97
also reflects this, as men make up approximately 68% of those arrested in the
sample.45 Thus, because of their higher rates of criminal justice involvement and
larger sample size of arrests within the NLSY97, this Article focuses on adult
men.
Criminal justice processing consists of four major decision points: arrest,
charging, conviction, and sentencing. In this Article, I focus on the previously
understudied middle stages of charging and conviction. My discussion and
analysis of sentencing disparities by race is limited to confirming that the results
conform with prior research that finds worse sentencing outcomes for Black
individuals.46 However, because those charged and convicted are a subset of
those arrested, it is necessary to understand the arrest process before turning to
the middle stages of charging and conviction.
A. ARREST AND SELECTION EFFECTS
Arrest represents the entry point into the criminal justice system and is
undertaken by police officers or other law enforcement agents. 47 Prosecutors and
judges occasionally play a role through coordination and approval of search and
arrest warrants.48
The various explanations for arrest-rate disparities by race can be split into
“warranted” and “unwarranted” factors.49 Differing underlying crime rates by

40. See Juvenile vs Adult Justice, PBS: FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
juvenile/stats/juvvsadult.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
41. See, e.g., Stevens & Morash, supra note 39.
42. See Jennifer Schwartz & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Nature of Female Offending: Patterns and
Explanation, in FEMALE OFFENDERS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 43 (Ruth T.
Zaplin ed., 2d ed. 2008).
43. See, e.g., Stevens & Morash, supra note 39.
44. Table 42: Arrests by Sex, 2018, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/table-42 (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
45. Author’s own analysis.
46. Many researchers using administrative datasets have found a sentencing disparity favoring White
individuals that remains after controlling for legally relevant variables. See, e.g., Curry & Corral-Camacho,
supra note 6; Doerner & Demuth, supra note 6; Everett & Wojtkiewicz, supra note 6; Fischman &
Schanzenbach, supra note 6; Schlesinger, supra note 6.
47. See YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING, ORIN S. KERR & EVE
BRENSIKE PRIMUS, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 8–9 (14th ed. 2015).
48. Id.
49. Gase et al., supra note 1, at 297; Schleiden et al., supra note 1, at 1.
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race would be a warranted factor. In contrast, police racial bias—such as racial
profiling in police stops or applying different evidentiary thresholds for arrest
depending on an individual’s race—would be considered unwarranted factors
driving arrest disparities. Given the striking differences in Black and White
arrest rates, much research attempts to determine whether warranted or
unwarranted factors drive these differences.
One approach for determining whether unwarranted factors play a role in
arrest rate disparities is to run regression analyses on self-reported data that
include a measure of underlying criminal activity. This research has generally
found that self-reported delinquency and other individual characteristics cannot
account for the large arrest disparities, indicating that there are at least some
unwarranted factors contributing to the discrepancies.50 Schleiden et al.’s 2020
analysis is perhaps the most striking, which found, after adjusting for contextual
and behavioral factors, that Black young adults (ages twenty-four to thirty-two)
had experienced an arrest rate51 seven times higher than their White
counterparts.52
Given that drug arrests make up the largest single category of annual
arrests, many studies using the same methodology to examine drug-related
arrests specifically reach similar conclusions.53 Some studies even find that
Black respondents are less likely to report using drugs but are nonetheless more
likely to report having been arrested for drug use.54 In sum, this line of literature
indicates that unwarranted factors play a role in arrest disparities by race, given
researchers’ consistent inability to explain away arrest disparities using various
warranted factors in regression analyses.
B. DETERMINANTS OF CHARGING AND CONVICTION
Once an individual is arrested, prosecutors, judges, and juries are
responsible for several decisions that ultimately affect the case’s outcome. First
is the prosecutor’s decision to bring charges against an arrestee.55 This step often
acts as a screening mechanism that accounts for factors such as:
• strength of evidence

50. Gase et al., supra note 1, at 309; Schleiden et al., supra note 1, at 10–11.
51. This included both juvenile and adult arrests. Schleiden et al., supra note 1, at 4.
52. Id. at 9.
53. See, e.g., Paula J. Fite, Porche’ Wynn & Dustin A. Pardini, Explaining Discrepancies in Arrest Rates
Between Black and White Male Juveniles, 77 J. CONSULT. CLINICAL PSYCH. 916 (2009); David W. Koch,
Jaewon Lee & Kyunghee Lee, Coloring the War on Drugs: Arrest Disparities in Black, Brown, and White,
8 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 313 (2016).
54. Meghana Kakade, Cristiane S. Duarte, Xinhua Liu, Cordelia J. Fuller, Ernest Drucker, Christina W.
Hoven, Bin Fan & Ping Wu, Adolescent Substance Use and Other Illegal Behaviors and Racial Disparities in
Criminal Justice System Involvement: Findings from a US National Survey, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1307, 1307
(2012); Ojmarrh Mitchell & Michael S. Caudy, Examining Racial Disparities in Drug Arrests, 32 JUST. Q. 288,
303 (2015).
55. See Criminal Charges: How Cases Get Started, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/
charged-with-crime-how-29677.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
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• seriousness of the offense
• evidence of police misconduct in the arrest
• likelihood of victim and witness cooperation
• characteristics of the individual defendant
• participation as a witness in a related case
• parole/probation status56

Once an arrestee has been charged, prosecutors, judges, and juries are
involved in the conviction step, through either charge dismissal, plea bargaining
and its subsequent approval, or trial.57 Prosecutors may decide to drop the charge
for any of the above reasons, or the judge may decide to dismiss the case.58 Since
the vast majority of cases either end in dropped charges or a plea bargain, a jury
is rarely involved in the conviction decision.59
In some jurisdictions, prosecutors charge nearly all arrestees and screen
cases by later dismissing charges. For instance, Kutateladze et al. (2014) report
that, in New York County, the prevailing practice in the prosecutor’s office is to
charge arrestees nearly universally, but later to drop charges against a significant
number of arrestees.60 In contrast, other jurisdictions have lower initial charging
rates, meaning that prosecutors are meaningfully screening at the charging stage
rather than afterward. For example, the average percent of cases declined for
prosecution in Florida for the years 2009 to 2013 was 22%,61 in comparison to
Kutateladze et al.’s finding that only 4% of cases were declined for prosecution
at the outset in New York County from 2010 to 2011.62

56. See AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-4.3 (2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/#:~:text=(a
)%20A%20prosecutor%20should%20seek,in%20the%20interests%20of%20justice (stating that a prosecutor
should only seek or file criminal charges if “the prosecutor reasonably believes the charges are supported by
probable cause” (speaking to strength of evidence), “the admissible evidence will be sufficient to support
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt” (speaking to evidence of police misconduct in arrest, which could lead
to suppressed evidence, and likelihood of victim and witness cooperation), and “the decision to charge is in the
interests of justice” (speaking to seriousness of the offense, evidence of police misconduct in the arrest,
characteristics of the individual defendant, and participation as a witness in a related case)); Sara J. Berman,
Probation Revocation, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/probation-revocation.html (last
visited Apr. 15, 2022).
57. See Plea Bargains, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/plea-bargains/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2022)
(describing the plea bargain process); Stages of a Criminal Case, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/
stages-of-a-criminal-case/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2022) (describing the trial process).
58. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 56, at 3-4.3, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/
standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/#:~:text=(a)%20A%20prosecutor%20should%20seek,in%20the
%20interests%20of%20justice (noting prosecutors should only maintain charges if they continue to “reasonably
believe probable cause exists and that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt”).
59. Plea Bargains, supra note 57 (“The overwhelming majority of criminal convictions (over 90 percent)
result from plea bargains.”).
60. Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 537–38.
61. Data Portal: Florida Measures, MEASURES FOR JUST., https://measuresforjustice.org/portal/FL?c=1
(last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
62. Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 527–28.
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These statistics suggest that across jurisdictions, prosecutors may use the
decision not to charge someone (charging conditional on arrest) and the decision
to drop a charge (conviction conditional on charging) in nearly identical
manners. Indeed, Measures for Justice, an organization that collects data on
criminal justice outcomes, recommends combining charges rejected for
prosecution with cases dismissed when analyzing data.63 Given the crossjurisdictional nature of my data, my main analysis combines the outcomes of
charging and conviction to examine the likelihood an individual is convicted,
conditional on having been arrested.
C. POTENTIAL RACIAL DISPARITIES
Racial differences in charging and conviction rates are plausible—and have
indeed been found in previous empirical research—in either direction. Given
that I ultimately find lower conviction rates for Black arrestees, I focus the
discussion in this section on plausible explanations for lower conviction rates. 64
Either racial bias (an unwarranted factor) or race-neutral prosecutorial screening
mechanisms (a warranted factor) could explain the lower conviction rates. This
section discusses each in turn.
1. Racial Bias
Ample empirical research has established the existence of unexplained
worse outcomes for Black individuals at the arrest and sentencing stages. 65
Researchers have presented evidence that some aspects of prosecutorial decision
making—such as pretrial detention,66 the decision of whether to bring charges
with a mandatory minimum,67 or charge reduction68—disfavor Black arrestees.
As such, it is highly unlikely that prosecutors exhibit racial bias against nonBlack arrestees solely in the decisions to bring an initial charge or later drop that
charge.
However, prosecutors’ racial bias against Black victims could translate into
a lower interest in pursuing crimes with Black victims.69 This type of racial bias
could potentially result in lower conviction rates for Black arrestees, given the
intraracial nature of crime.

63. Data Portal: Measures, MEASURES FOR JUST., https://measuresforjustice.org/portal/measures (last
visited Apr. 15, 2022).
64. Explanations for Black arrestees to experience higher conviction rates could include either prosecutor
racial bias against Black arrestees or prosecutor charging based on prior criminal records, as Black arrestees
statistically have more criminal justice contact.
65. See sources cited supra note 6.
66. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 26, at 11 (summarizing empirical research finding that Black and
Hispanic defendants were treated harsher in the decision on pretrial release).
67. See, e.g., Rehavi & Starr, supra note 27, at 1323.
68. See, e.g., Shermer & Johnson, supra note 28, at 415.
69. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 26, at 8 (discussing studies finding that defendants with minority
victims were treated more leniently).
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2. Race-Neutral Screening Mechanisms
Various race-neutral screening mechanisms may lead to lower conviction
rates for Black arrestees. First, selection effects at the arrest stage could lead to
this result. As mentioned above, prosecutors often screen cases based on the
strength of evidence, seriousness of the offense, and any evidence of police
misconduct in the arrest.70 To the extent that police over-arrest Black individuals
in a discriminatory manner, these race-neutral screening mechanisms could lead
to a lower conviction rate for Black arrestees. Namely, if police officers are more
willing to arrest Black individuals than White individuals (1) in situations when
evidence of a crime is weak, (2) for relatively minor crimes, or (3) via use of any
form of police misconduct, one would expect to see a higher conviction rate for
White individuals based on prosecutorial (as well as judicial) screening.
Second, race-neutral screening based on victim or witness cooperation
could lead to lower rates of conviction for Black arrestees. Crime is most often
intraracial in nature.71 Mistrust of the criminal justice system among the Black
population might lead to a lower willingness of victim or witness cooperation,72
which could ultimately lead to lower conviction rates for Black arrestees.
Third, racial differences in existing criminal records could plausibly result
in lower conviction rates for Black arrestees. If Black individuals are more likely
to already be on parole or probation at the time of arrest, prosecutors may be less
likely to pursue a conviction against them and instead revoke parole or
probation, which would yield a technically lower conviction rate.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. AVAILABLE DATA
Empirical researchers study criminal justice outcomes using two categories
of data. Some studies are based on longitudinal datasets that collect self-reported
data on criminal justice involvement. The two major, nationally representative
datasets that fall into this category are the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY79 or NLSY97)73 and the National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescent to Adult Health (ADD Health).74 While both studies focus on youth,
they contain years’ worth of information on respondents once they reach

70. See supra Part I.B.
71. Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 538.
72. Id.
73. See National Longitudinal Surveys: NLSY79 Data Overview, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2022); National Longitudinal Surveys: NLSY97 Data
Overview, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy97.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2022)
[hereinafter NLSY97 Data Overview].
74. See Data, ADD HEALTH, https://addhealth.cpc.unc.edu/data (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
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adulthood. Smaller longitudinal studies also occur at the local level and have
been used in some instances to study criminal justice outcomes. 75
In the alternative, some studies use administrative datasets. A few
databases compile data on criminal justice processing across jurisdictions, 76 but
most of these datasets tend to be jurisdiction specific. These datasets typically
contain detailed data on the procedural aspects of criminal justice processing but
lack information on arrestees’ personal backgrounds and characteristics. For
example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics data “State Court Processing Statistics:
Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties”—a dataset used in two of the
studies looking at the relationship between race and case dismissals—contains
detailed procedural data.77 The available information includes the “arrest
charges, criminal justice status at time of arrest, prior arrests and convictions,
pretrial release and detention, court appearance record, rearrests while on pretrial
release, type and outcome of adjudication, and type and length of sentence.” 78
The dataset, however, lacks any information on defendants’ personal
characteristics beyond age, race, and sex.79
Studies that have previously examined racial disparities in conviction rates
have used administrative datasets,80 whereas I use the NLSY97, a self-reported
dataset. Three main benefits come from using the NLSY97 to expand on prior
studies. First, the NLSY97 contains a wealth of information on personal
background and characteristics, such as respondents’ income, work history,
education, household structure, neighborhood characteristics, and self-reported
criminal activity and substance use.81 To the extent that criminal justice
outcomes are related to income, neighborhood, and education level (among other
variables)—which research has established are correlated with race82—
examining administrative datasets that do not include these variables may
capture an effect, or lack of effect, of race that is attributable to other factors. I
75. See, e.g., Fite et al., supra note 53, at 917 (using longitudinal data from the Pittsburgh Youth Study to
examine racial disparities in juvenile arrests).
76. See, e.g., Data Collection: State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS), BUREAU JUST. STATS.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=282 (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
81. See infra Part IV.
82. See Neil Bhutta, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. Dettling & Joanne W. Hsu, Disparities in Wealth by Race
and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.: FEDS
NOTES (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-by-raceand-ethnicity-in-the-2019-survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.htm (race and wealth); Tracy Hadden Loh,
Christopher Coes & Becca Buthe, The Great Real Estate Reset: Separate and Unequal: Persistent Residential
Segregation is Sustaining Racial and Economic Injustice in the U.S., BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/essay/trend-1-separate-and-unequal-neighborhoods-are-sustaining-racial-andeconomic-injustice-in-the-us (race and neighborhood); United States Population Trends and Educational
Attainment: Educational Attainment, by Race and Ethnicity, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC.,
https://www.equityinhighered.org/indicators/u-s-population-trends-and-educational-attainment/educationalattainment-by-race-and-ethnicity (last visited Apr. 15, 2022) (race and education).
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can account for this possibility by controlling for these characteristics in
regressions and exploiting the longitudinal nature of the data. I am also able to
control for self-reported delinquent activity, which minimizes any concern that
differences in conviction rates reflects racial differences in criminal offending.
Second, the NLSY97 questions on criminal justice involvement are not
limited to certain types of crimes or specific jurisdictions. Rather, the NLSY97
asks all respondents, who constitute a nationally representative sample, about all
arrests they experience.83 Where many studies based on administrative datasets
are limited to specific jurisdictions84 or specific crime types, such as felonies,85
the NLSY97 accounts for a nationally representative sample of all arrests.
Finally, the NLSY97 contains data on both arrests that do not ultimately
result in a criminal charge and charges that do not ultimately result in
conviction.86 As described above, prosecutorial screening can occur at either the
charging stage or after charges have already been filed.87 Many administrative
datasets contain only post-charging data and therefore may miss a major aspect
of prosecutorial screening, depending on the jurisdiction being studied.88
In sum, using the NLSY97 gives a broad, nationally representative picture
of arrest-level outcomes. While I cannot look closely at the mechanisms through
which any racial disparities arise—for instance, through pretrial detention and
bail decisions—this Article provides a broad understanding of racial disparities
in conviction rates that has not yet been quantified.
B. PRIOR MIXED FINDINGS
Consistent patterns have emerged in the extensive research on the
relationship between race and arrests and sentencing, but prosecutorial
discretion wielded during the middle stages of charging and conviction have
been referred to as a black box as far as empirical research goes.89 Theory on the
direction of racial disparities in conviction rates is ambiguous, as discussed
above in Part I.C., and empirical research has yet to provide consistent evidence
in either direction. Some studies find that Black individuals experience higher

83. See Crime, Delinquency & Arrest, supra note 19.
84. See, e.g., Berdejó, supra note 9, at 1205 (Dane County, Wisconsin); Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at
514 (New York County, New York).
85. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 9, at 695 (felonies only); Tomic & Hakes, supra note 9, at 514 (felonies
only).
86. See Crime, Delinquency & Arrest, supra note 19.
87. See supra Part I.B.
88. See, e.g., Berdejó, supra note 9, at 1205 (“The analyses presented later in the Article restrict the sample
to cases filed and adjudicated in Dane County.”) (emphasis added); Franklin, supra note 9, at 695 (“Information
provided by the 1998 SCPS was based on felony cases filed in thirty-nine of the nation’s seventy-five largest
counties.”) (emphasis added); Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 522 (“The data consist of 159,206
misdemeanors and 26,069 felonies accepted for prosecution by DANY and disposed of in 2010–2011.”)
(emphasis added); Tomic & Hakes, supra note 9, at 123 (“The file contains 72,602 observations on felony
defendants in fifty-four of the nation’s seventy-five most populous counties.”) (emphasis added).
89. See Shermer & Johnson, supra note 28, at 395.
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rates of case dismissal than White individuals, some find no difference, and
some find that Black individuals are treated more harshly at this decision point. 90
Tomic and Hakes (2008) examine Bureau of Justice Statistics data on
1990s felony defendants in highly populated U.S. counties, which account for
approximately one third of the U.S. population.91 Franklin (2010) performs a
similar analysis using the same dataset but with a more limited timeframe, which
focused on felony defendants in 1998.92 When pooling all felony defendants,
both studies find no impact of race on likelihood of case dismissal.93
However, both studies find differences in case dismissal rates by race when
examining certain subsets of felony defendants. When Franklin splits his
analysis by region, he finds that charges against Black defendants in the South
are less likely to be dropped than charges against White defendants in the
South.94 Tomic and Hakes split their analysis by crime type and find some
evidence of a higher case-dismissal rate for Black arrestees when the type of
crime arrested for is one that involves police making on-scene, snap
judgments.95
Kutateladze et al. (2014) use a large dataset from the New York County
District Attorney’s office in 2010–2011 to examine the cumulative effects of
race and ethnicity on criminal justice outcomes.96 They find that, compared with
White individuals, Black and Latino97 individuals experience many harsher
outcomes in that they are more likely to be detained pretrial, be offered a plea
agreement that includes incarceration (as compared to being offered a plea
agreement with no incarceration), and be ultimately sentenced to a period of
incarceration.98 However, they find that, of arrestees who are charged by the
District Attorney’s office, Black and Latino individuals are more likely to have
their charges dropped than White individuals.99
Kutateladze et al. note two possible explanations for this finding,
corresponding to two of the theories described above in Part I.C. First, police
90. Berdejó, supra note 9, at 1191 (lower likelihood of dropped or reduced charges for Black individuals);
Franklin, supra note 9, at 699 (mixed findings); Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 538 (higher likelihood of
dropped charges for Black and Latino individuals); Tomic & Hakes, supra note 9, at 135 (mixed findings). Note
that the only study finding worse outcomes for Black arrestees in terms of charge dismissals combined the
outcomes of charge reduction and charge dismissal. Berdejó, supra note 9, at 1218–19. The implications of this
are discussed in more depth in Part V.A.
91. See Tomic & Hakes, supra note 9, at 123.
92. Franklin, supra note 9, at 695.
93. Id. at 699 (“It should be noted that in the current study, race was found to have no influence on case
dismissals when its effect was averaged across the entire sample of counties.”); Tomic & Hakes, supra note 9,
at 134 (reporting a statistically insignificant race coefficient in the “All Crimes” category).
94. Franklin, supra note 9, at 699.
95. Tomic & Hakes, supra note 9, at 110.
96. Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 522.
97. I switch between using the terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” throughout this Article. I do so to reflect the
language used by the data and prior research I use. For instance, the NLSY97 uses the term “Hispanic,” while
Kutateladze et al. use the term “Latino.”
98. Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 514.
99. Id.
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may be more willing to arrest Black and Latino individuals “even when
insufficient evidence exists to support prosecution.”100 In other words, police
may be acting in a racially discriminatory manner. Second, they suggest the
possibility that victims in crimes involving Black or Latino perpetrators—who
tend to be Black or Latino themselves due to the often intraracial nature of
crime—may be less willing to cooperate with police, which may lead to lower
conviction rates.101
Berdejó (2018) uses detailed data from Dane County, Wisconsin to
examine conviction outcomes by race.102 He finds that, of individuals charged
with a crime, White defendants were 25.49% more likely to have their principal
charge either dropped or reduced.103 He finds that these disparities are most
pronounced in low-level crimes and in cases when the individual had no prior
criminal record.104
Notably, all four of these studies contain data only on those arrests in which
prosecutors filed initial charges. To the extent that the prosecutors’ offices
represented in the studies’ data use charging as a meaningful screening point,
these studies may be capturing only a portion of relevant prosecutorial
decisionmaking.
Studies that focus on other outcomes also contain information on the
relationship of race with charging and conviction. For instance, Stevens &
Morash (2014) use the NLSY79 and NLSY97 to determine whether the trend
towards a punitive focus in juvenile justice policy between 1980 and 2000
impacted boys’ likelihood of various juvenile justice outcomes.105 While not
their question of interest, one of their findings is that, overall, arrested Black
juveniles experience lower conviction rates than arrested White juveniles, and
note that “[c]ontext-specific research is needed to sort out occasional findings of
this apparent break in a pattern of harsher treatment of Black youth.”106 Rehavi
and Starr (2014) examine how charging decisions affect sentencing outcomes of
federal defendants.107 The main result is that prosecutors are more likely to bring
a charge that comes with a mandatory minimum sentence against Black arrestees
than White arrestees, leading to longer sentences.108 However, the descriptive
statistics of whether an arrestee was charged and convicted present practically
identical rates for Black and White defendants.109

100. Id. at 538.
101. Id.
102. Berdejó, supra note 9, at 1239–40.
103. Berdejó combines the outcomes of dropping charges with reducing charges. Id. at 1214–24. It is
possible that splitting the outcomes and examining dropped charges only would yield different results.
104. Id. at 1191–92.
105. Stevens & Morash, supra note 39, at 77.
106. Id. at 89.
107. Rehavi & Starr, supra note 27, at 1320.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1329.
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In sum, existing research on the middle stages of criminal justice
processing is mixed in its results and taken as a whole, leaves open questions
about how race impacts conviction outcomes. In contrast, studies concerning
race and ethnicity’s relation to arrests and sentencing decisions consistently
reveal worse outcomes for Black individuals at the arrest stage and for Black
and Latino individuals at the sentencing stage.110 My study is the first to use the
extensive, nationally representative data available in the NLSY97 to examine
charging and conviction outcomes by race and ethnicity, while controlling for
other individual-level variables that could impact criminal justice outcomes.
III. DATA
I use data from the NLSY97 to examine the relationship between
race/ethnicity and conviction rates. The NLSY97 is a nationally
representative111 dataset that follows the lives of 8,984 American individuals
who were born between 1980 and 1984.112 The initial survey was conducted in
1997, when the respondents were ages twelve to seventeen. Follow-up surveys
were conducted annually from 1997 to 2011 and biennially after. The most
recent available data comes from the eighteenth wave of the survey in 2017,
when the respondents were ages thirty-two to thirty-six.
This dataset is particularly well-suited to examine criminal justice
processing in depth because of its longitudinal, nationally representative nature,
extensive information on respondents’ underlying characteristics, and detailed
data on self-reported criminal activity, arrests, charges, convictions, and
incarcerations.113 Further, because youth and young adults commit the vast
majority of crimes,114 my use of the NLSY97 captures data for the years in which
individuals are most likely to commit crimes.
At each interview, respondents were asked whether they were arrested
since the date of their last interview and, if so, how many times.115 Respondents
can report an unlimited number of arrests for each period, which sometimes

110. See sources cited supra note 6.
111. The NLSY97 sample is representative of the U.S. civilian, noninstitutional population who were ages
twelve to sixteen as of December 31, 1996. The survey consists of an original cross-sectional sample of and an
additional, supplemental sample that oversampled Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black youth. The supplemental
sample was included to provide statistical power when analyzing outcomes specific to these two groups. NLSY97
Data Overview, supra note 73.
112. Id.
113. See Crime, Delinquency, & Arrest, NAT’L LONGITUDINAL SURVEYS, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97/topical-guide/crime/crime-delinquency-arrest (last visited Apr.
15, 2022).
114. See Jeffrey T. Ulmer & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Age and Crime Relationship: Social Variation,
Social Explanations, in THE NURTURE VERSUS BIOSOCIAL DEBATE IN CRIMINOLOGY: ON THE ORIGINS OF
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND CRIMINALITY 377–78 (Kevin M. Beaver et. al eds., 2014).
115. See Crime, Delinquency, & Arrest, supra note 113 (the information cited for notes 115–23 was taken
from the raw data in the NLS Investigator).
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yields very high numbers of reported arrests.116 Through 2002, the NLSY
collected arrest-specific charging, conviction, and incarceration data on up to
nine arrests. In the 2003 round and later, the NLSY did not collect charging,
conviction, or incarceration data at the individual arrest level for survey periods
in which a respondent reported more than three arrests.117 Because of this, I limit
my main regression analysis to the first three arrests reported each survey
period.118
For each of the first three arrests, the survey then collects detailed
information on each arrest.119 For each arrest, respondents are asked whether
they were charged and, for each charge, whether they were convicted. 120
Subsequently for each conviction, the individual is asked about sentencing
outcomes.121
For individuals who were charged, the data also contains information on
the type of charge.122 Individuals can select multiple charges and can report
being charged with one crime and convicted of a different crime.123 The options
for charge type include assault,124 robbery,125 burglary,126 theft,127 destruction of
property,128 other property crimes,129 possession of illegal drugs,130 selling

116. For instance, in 2004, three respondents reported having experienced more than ten arrests since the
date of their last interview.
117. See Crime, Delinquency, & Arrest, supra note 113.
118. For those respondents who reported more than three arrests in 2003 and later, the NLSY asked for
outcomes about all arrests combined. I treat their responses as a single arrest for that period and include a flag
variable to indicate these observations. I additionally run two robustness checks. First, I treat these respondents’
data as three separate arrests (i.e., I include the observation for that year in the regression three times) and again
include a flag variable for those observations. Second, I exclude the data from these individuals. Neither of these
meaningfully changes my results. Id. (the information cited was taken from the raw data in the NLS Investigator).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Note that sentencing data is not available for the 2003 wave of the survey.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with assault, that is, an attack with a weapon or your
hands, such as battery, rape, aggravated assault, or manslaughter?” Questionnaire Public Report, NAT’L
LONGITUDINAL SURVEYS, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., YSAQ-456 (2012), https://www.nlsinfo.org/sites/
default/files/attachments/121128/nlsy97r1ysaq.html.
125. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with robbery, that is taking something from someone
using a weapon or force?” Id. at YSAQ-457.
126. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with burglary and breaking and entering, that is, breaking
into private property without permission in order to steal?” Id. at YSAQ-458.
127. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with theft, that is, stealing something without the use of
force, such as auto theft, larceny, or shoplifting?” Id. at YSAQ-459.
128. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with destruction of property, that is, vandalism, arson,
malicious destruction, or shoplifting?” Id. at YSAQ-460.
129. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with other property offenses, such as, fencing, receiving,
possessing or selling stolen property?” Id. at YSAQ-461.
130. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with possession or use of illicit drugs?” Id. at YSAQ-462.
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illegal drugs,131 major traffic offense,132 public order offense,133 and other
offense.134
Unfortunately, the NLSY97 does not contain data indicating whether each
charge was for a misdemeanor or felony. While some charge categories are
almost always felonies, such as robbery, and some are clearly misdemeanors,
such as public disorder, most of the charge categories make it difficult to
differentiate.
I use respondents’ answers to the questions on criminal justice contact to
create my outcome of interest. For each arrest that occurred after age eighteen, I
create a dichotomous variable that is equal to zero if the respondent is not
convicted of a crime and equal to one if the respondent is convicted. Running
regression analyses where this variable is my outcome of interest allows me to
determine the likelihood of conviction based on various individual
characteristics.
Many individual characteristics that may impact a respondent’s likelihood
of conviction are available in the NLSY97 data. First and foremost is my
outcome of interest: race and ethnicity. Based on two questions the NLSY asks
about race and ethnicity, I create three mutually exclusive categories for NonHispanic White, Black, and Hispanic.135
By measuring and controlling for many characteristics that may be
associated with criminal justice outcomes, I can isolate the relationship between
race/ethnicity and conviction. I include seven basic categories of control
variables that may impact conviction rates: geographic (region of residence,
lives in high-risk neighborhood136), household (living with partner, living with
child), labor market (employed), education (currently enrolled in school, college
graduate), finances (household below 200% of the poverty line), criminal
activity (delinquency index, drug use), and criminal history (number of prior
arrests).

131. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with the sale or trafficking of illicit drugs?” Id. at YSAQ463.
132. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with a major traffic offense, such as, driving under the
influence of alcohol or other drugs, reckless driving, or driving without a license?” Id. at YSAQ-464.
133. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with a public order offense, such as, drinking or
purchasing alcohol while under the legal age, disorderly conduct or a sex offense?” Id. at YSAQ-465.
134. Answered yes to: “Did the police charge you with any other offense we have not talked about?” Id. at
YSAQ-466.
135. I additionally have another category for those who identified as Mixed Race (Non-Hispanic), “Asian
or Pacific Islander,” and “American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut.” I exclude these observations due to the small
sample size (146 male respondents). See Crime, Delinquency, & Arrest, supra note 113 (the information cited
was taken from the raw data in the NLS Investigator).
136. Following Mitchell & Caudy, supra note 54, at 300, I combine whether the respondent resides in an
inner-city neighborhood with whether the respondent reports that their neighborhood or school has gangs,
creating a single dichotomous variable that reflects whether an individual lives in a high-risk neighborhood.
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IV. RESULTS
I begin by checking whether the NLSY97 data reflect reasonable
conviction rates by comparing them to other publicly available data on criminal
justice outcomes. Measures for Justice, an organization dedicated to providing
access to accurate criminal justice data, has data available for fifteen states on
the percentage of cases filed in court that result in a conviction in years 2009–
2013,137 which corresponds to my data on convictions per charge. Unfortunately,
data on the rate of charges that were declined for prosecution—which
corresponds to my data on charges per arrest—are only available for one state.138
I do, however, find that my convictions per charge is reasonable as compared to
the fifteen states with that available data, which average 68.1%.139 My average
conviction rate per charge across the entire sample is 71.2%.140
I next turn to discussing arrest, conviction, and incarceration rates by
race/ethnicity. To isolate the impact of race/ethnicity on arrest, conviction, and
incarceration rates, I conduct a multiple regression analysis, which accounts for
geographic, household, labor market, education, financial, and criminal history
characteristics, along with measures for self-reported delinquent behavior and
drug use. For convictions and sentencing, I run one additional set of regressions
in which I control for the type of crime the respondent was charged with. By
controlling for these variables, I can determine that any remaining difference in
conviction rates by race are not driven by systematic differences in these
variables.
I first present estimates on the relationship between race/ethnicity and
arrest and incarceration to confirm that my NLSY97 analysis reflects prior
research findings. I do so by comparing both raw disparities and those that
remain after controlling for other individual characteristics in regression
analyses.
Figure 1 shows the percent of male respondents arrested each year, split by
race and ethnicity. The NLSY97 reflects prior findings that Black men are at the
highest risk of arrest as compared with White and Hispanic men, with a yearly
arrest rate of 9.5%.
This disparity is not eliminated by controlling for other characteristics in
regression analysis. Appendix Table B.I (column 1) shows that Black men
experience a 6.7 percentage-point higher likelihood of arrest than their White
counterparts after controlling for other individual characteristics (as compared
with the approximately 3.5 percentage-point raw difference as shown in Figure
137. See Data Portal, MEASURES FOR JUST., https://measuresforjustice.org/portal (last visited Apr. 15,
2022). States with available state-wide conviction rates for years 2009–2013 include Alabama, Arkansas,
Arizona, Florida, Indiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. I include both women and juveniles in this number, as the Measures for Justice data are missing data
on age and sex for many of the fifteen states.

May 2022

MASS CRIMINALIZATION AND RACIAL DISPARITIES

1121

1). This means that after controlling for other factors that impact arrest rates—
such as a delinquency index, drug use, region, living in a high-risk
neighborhood, household characteristics, and education141—the disparity
between Black and White male annual arrest rates is larger than the raw
disparity. There is no statistically significant disparity in annual arrest rate
between White men and Hispanic men in either the raw data or the regression
analysis.
FIGURE 1: ARRESTED (PER YEAR)
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All values are calculated using the NLSY sample weights.
https://www.nlsinfo.org/weights/nlsy97. Arrest rates (per year) exclude those
who were in prison or living out of the country during the prior survey round.

Arrest disparities disfavoring the Black population are also borne out in
cumulative statistics. For instance, as of 2017, 50.35% of Black men had been
arrested as an adult at least once, while 39.34% of Hispanic men and 34.73% of
White men had been arrested as adults. This translates to a 28% and 45% higher
probability of arrest for Black men than Hispanic and White men, respectively.
Figure 2 shows sentencing disparities by race/ethnicity. This figure
represents the percent of convicted individuals who were sentenced to a term in
jail or prison. Here, there is a clear and statistically significant disparity in
comparing both Black men and Hispanic men’s incarceration rates to White
men’s incarceration rate. Again, these disparities are not eliminated by

141. Individual characteristics associated with higher risk of arrest include higher delinquency index,
marijuana use, hard drug use, living in a high-risk neighborhood, or living in the North Central region of the
United States. Individual characteristics associated with lower risk of arrest include living with a partner/spouse,
living with a child, and being a college graduate. Prior arrests were associated with a lower risk of arrest, but
this is only because of the way the regression function is set up. See discussion infra App. Part B for further
discussion of this issue.
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controlling for other relevant characteristics in regression analysis, as can be
seen in Appendix Table B.I (column 3).142
FIGURE 2: INCARCERATED (PER CONVICTION)
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All values are calculated using the
https://www.nlsinfo.org/weights/nlsy97.
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sample

weights.

Given these outcomes, one might expect similarly poor outcomes for Black
individuals at the conviction stage. However, as seen in Figure 3, relative to both
Hispanic and White men, Black respondents have the lowest conviction rate at
approximately 40%. These raw differences align with the subset of the existing
empirical literature that finds Black individuals receive more favorable
treatment in terms of case dismissals.143 Hispanic men also have lower
conviction rates than their White counterparts, but the difference is not as
drastic.144

142. In the regression analysis, both Black and Hispanic men were approximately 23 percentage points more
likely to experience incarceration, conditional on conviction, than their White counterparts. Other predictors of
incarceration include a higher delinquency score and living in the Southern region (positive association), as well
as living with a child and being enrolled in school (negative association).
143. Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 531; Tomic & Hakes, supra note 9, at 111.
144. This reflects Kutateladze et al.’s finding of higher charge dismissal rates for Latino defendants in New
York County. See Kutateladze et al., supra note 9, at 531. I also run my regression analysis by region and find
that the disparity for Hispanic arrestees is limited to the Northeast region of the United States. This disparity is
less robust than the Black-White disparity and will need to be explored further in future work.
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FIGURE 3: CONVICTED (PER ARREST)
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The conviction rate differences from my regression analysis generally
follow that of the disparities from descriptive statistics. My regression of
interest, shown in Appendix Table B.I (column 2) indicates that Black arrested
men were 15.7 percentage points less likely to be convicted than White arrested
men, and Hispanic arrested men were 7.2 percentage points less likely to be
convicted than their White counterparts. The 15.7 percentage-point difference
for Black men translates to a 29% lower conviction rate for Black men as
compared with White men.145
One possible explanation for the lower conviction rate for Black and
Hispanic individuals is that they are arrested for different types of crimes than
White individuals—namely, crimes that are less likely to result in a conviction.
To check this, I estimate regressions that also include charge type. This
regression is the same as my main analysis but estimates conviction conditional
on charging (as opposed to conditional on arrest) and controls for the type of
crime for which the arrestee was charged. The results from this regression are
presented in Appendix Table B.II. The racial disparity does not disappear, and
Black arrestees charged with a crime are 11.4 percentage points less likely to be
convicted of any crime than their White counterparts. In this regression,
however, the disparity between Hispanic and White arrestees disappears,

145. This is calculated by dividing the 15.7 percentage point difference by the mean conviction rate for
White men of approximately 54%.
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indicating that the conviction rate disparity by ethnicity either can be explained
by differences in the types of crimes Hispanic and White men are arrested for or
is limited entirely to the charging stage.
A. POTENTIAL MECHANISMS
As discussed above, four potential explanations could account for the result
in lower conviction rates for Black men: over-arrest of Black men, differences
in victim and witness characteristics, different rates of existing parole or
probation, and racial bias against non-Black arrestees.146
First, as I argue in Part I.C. above, racial bias against non-Black arrestees
is highly unlikely, given that researchers have found consistent unexplained
disparities that result in worse outcomes for Black individuals at nearly all other
decision points in the criminal justice system.147 I provide some insight into
which of the three remaining explanations is true through supplementary
analysis.
To determine whether higher rates of active probation or parole among
Black arrestees could be driving the results, I perform a supplemental analysis
that includes first arrests only. The results of this analysis are presented in
Appendix Table B.III. I find that a large disparity persists in these first-time
arrests, with Black arrestees being 14 percentage points less likely to be
convicted. These results indicate that differing parole or probation rates by race
are not driving the results, given that those who are arrested for the first time are
not on active probation or parole.
Next, I consider the remaining two possibilities of over-arrest and
differences in victim and witness characteristics. The conviction disparity could
reflect policing practices that result in discriminatory arrest of Black men.
Prosecutors use screening processes that should, in theory, eliminate cases with
weak evidence,148 for some minor crimes,149 or that involve police
misconduct.150 If police are more likely to arrest Black men—as opposed to
White men—in these scenarios, prosecutors’ screening would result in lower
charging and conviction rates for Black men. Second, given the intraracial nature
of crime, this disparity could be explained by victim and witness characteristics.
It is possible either that prosecutors are less inclined to pursue cases with Black
victims due to racial bias or that there is a lower rate of victim and witness
cooperation rate among Black victims, given mistrust of the criminal justice
system.

146. See supra Part I.C.
147. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text (discussing research on racial disparities in prosecutorial
decision-making); see supra Part I.A (summarizing research on racial disparities in arrests); infra Part I.B
(summarizing research on racial disparities in conviction).
148. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 13 (2007).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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To investigate both possibilities, I model my analysis off Tomic and Hakes
(2008). They find some evidence that Black defendants experience higher rates
of charge dismissal than White defendants in cases for which police have high
discretion and make on the spot decisions.151 Their category of high-discretion
crimes is described as those that “lead to on-scene arrests.”152 In this category,
they include driving offenses, weapons offenses, drug trafficking, other drug
charges, public offenses, and “other violent” crimes, which tend to involve
domestic violence.153 Their non-high-discretion crimes include murder, rape,
robbery, assault, theft, other property, and burglary.154 I follow their
methodology and map my crimes onto their two categories, as follows:
High Police Discretion Crimes
Drug Possession
Drug Sale
Major Traffic Offenses
Public Disorder

Low Police Discretion Crimes
Assault
Burglary
Robbery
Theft
Destruction of Property
Other Property Crime

In addition, the split of high-discretion and low-discretion crimes also
conveniently maps onto crimes that likely involve victims. The category of highdiscretion crimes generally includes those crimes that do not involve victims.
I split my sample by the type of crime arrestees are charged with to see
where the disparity is most concentrated. The results from this regression are
presented in Appendix Table B.IV. I find that disparity in conviction rates is
concentrated in high police discretion crimes, with no statistically significant
racial disparity among low police discretion crimes. Given that high discretion
crime types are generally victimless and are those where police bias is most
likely to arise, the most likely explanation is over-arrest of Black men for highdiscretion crimes.
Also notable from this regression analysis is that in the category of highdiscretion crimes, poverty is a large predictor of conviction. Namely, those
charged with drug possession, drug sales, public disorder, or major traffic
offenses who fall below two times the federal poverty line are 20% more likely
to be convicted of a crime than those with incomes at least two times the federal
poverty line. This highlights problems with cash bail and the criminalization of
poverty more generally and should be explored in future research.

151. Tomic & Hakes, supra note 9, at 135–36.
152. Id. at 128.
153. Id.
154. I exclude observations that do not indicate a specific crime type or chose “other crime” for charge type,
as these cannot map specifically onto high or low discretion crimes. However, I run robustness checks in which
I include these observations in both categories, and their inclusion does not change my results.
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V. DISCUSSION
A clear pattern of criminal justice processing emerges in my analysis. First,
Black individuals are at a higher risk of arrest each survey period, even after
controlling for other relevant factors such as socioeconomic status, living in a
high-risk neighborhood, region, education, family, and self-reported
delinquency. Second, the likelihood of conviction for Black arrestees is
significantly lower than for White arrestees. There is some evidence that
Hispanic arrestees experience lower conviction rates than White arrestees, but
the disparity loses statistical significance when controlling for the type of crime
charged. Finally, of those who are convicted, Black and Hispanic individuals are
incarcerated at much higher rates than White individuals.
My findings of disparities that favor White respondents at the arrest and
sentencing stage offer nothing more than confirmation of previous researchers’
findings. My findings on conviction rates, however, provide new and important
information on the experiences of Black male arrestees throughout the United
States. Specifically, I find that they are 29% (approximately 16 percentage
points) less likely to be convicted of a crime than their White counterparts,
conditional on having been arrested. Given that this disparity is limited to crimes
for which police make on-the-spot decisions about arrest, I suggest that racial
bias in policing likely drives the results.
A. RECONCILIATION WITH PRIOR RESEARCH
Given the lack of consensus in the literature, it is worth considering the
differences between my underlying sample and those studies that found either
no difference or a disparity in favor of White defendants during the charging and
conviction stages.
First, the only study to my knowledge that has found an association
between Black arrestees and higher case dismissal rates is Berdejó’s 2018
study.155 Berdejó combines the outcomes of case dismissal with charge
reduction when analyzing racial disparities, and these two outcomes may be
subject to different decision rules.156 Thus, it is possible Berdejó’s results are
being driven mostly by the outcome of charge reduction and not that of case
dismissal.
Next, studies that use only post-charging data may not capture meaningful
prosecutorial screening if prosecutors in the jurisdiction being studied engage in
screening at the initial charging decision. Finally, the type of crime appears to
matter. To the extent that drug possession, traffic offenses, and public disorder
drive my results, it is unsurprising that studies including only felony crimes do
not find overall lower conviction rates for Black arrestees, given that many of
these crimes are not felonies.

155. See Berdejó, supra note 8, at 1190.
156. Id. at 1188.
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In sum, I propose that large-scale arrests for low-level crimes, for which
police maintain large amounts of discretion, likely result in significantly lower
conviction rates for Black arrestees on a national scale. One driver of arrests for
low-level crimes is Broken Windows policing. Broken Windows policing
reflects the practice of arresting individuals for relatively minor public disorder
crimes based on the theory that such arrests will prevent more serious crimes. 157
Issa Kohler-Hausman shows in her book, Misdemeanorland, that upon the
introduction of Broken Windows policing in New York City in the early 1990s,
the number of case dismissals rose dramatically, and, in turn, conviction rates
dropped.158
Research has shown that the Black community and other disadvantaged
communities have borne the brunt of costs from Broken Windows policing.159
Advocates for racial justice have cited these types of arrests as a problem that is
“central to the racial contours of American criminal justice.”160 My findings
likely reflect some of the consequences of the implementation of Broken
Windows policing across the country.
B. IMPLICATIONS
If arrests were costless, my findings would be positive, at best, and
unimportant, at worst. It appears that prosecutors are, to some extent, correcting
for the over-arrest of Black men, which some might interpret as indicative of a
fair legal system.161 However, arrests are costly in and of themselves. Policing
requires a substantial government budget.162 Many would consider undertaking
many arrests that are ultimately not fully prosecuted to be a large waste of tax
dollars.
Further, arrests create large costs on the individuals and communities in
which they occur. My research shows that, on a national level, current policing
practices result in more than half of Black men being arrested at least once by
157. See Broken Windows Policing, GEORGE MASON CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POL’ Y,
https://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/what-works-in-policing/research-evidence-review/broken-windowspolicing (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
158. ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE
OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 68 (2019).
159. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder
in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 457 (2000); Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis
of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias,
102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007).
160. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM
TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 163 (2018).
161. Note that this is not to say that racial bias is not present in prosecutorial decision-making, but rather,
that race-neutral prosecutorial screening mechanisms combined with selection effects at the arrest stage appear
to drive racial disparities in conviction rates at the national level.
162. See Criminal Justice Expenditures: Police, Corrections, and Courts, URB. INST.,
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-localbackgrounders/criminal-justice-police-corrections-courts-expenditures (last visited Apr. 15, 2022) (showing that
the policing budget as a percent of the overall budget was 6% for local governments, 13% for city governments,
8% for county governments, and 10% for township governments in 2017).
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young adulthood.163 These large-scale arrests likely contribute to socioeconomic
inequality on an expansive basis.164
Arrests can cause immediate harm to the arrested individual in terms of job
loss, financial costs, and psychological stress.165 Arrest records can further close
doors to future opportunities in education and the labor market.166 Large-scale
arrests of Black men that appear arbitrary lead to distrust of police among the
Black community.167 Further, the more stops and arrests that occur, the higher
the likelihood of police violence.
An example of a major problem arising from the large number of
conviction-less arrests of Black men is related to how employers use arrest
information as bases for adverse employment actions. Employees can legally
lose their jobs for missing work due to detention related to an arrest, even if the
arrest itself was baseless.168 As far as stigma from an arrest goes, when applying
for future jobs, Eisha Jain provides an apt explanation of this problem: “If an
employer relies on drug screening, for instance, it cannot disproportionately
target minorities. But when employers and licensing authorities rely on arrests,
they leave front-end decisions about whom to screen to the police, without
similar regard for racially disparate impact.”169
Finally, racially disparate arrests also exacerbate the perception of “black
criminality.”170 No empirical study to date has documented the nationwide
disparity in conviction rates between Black and White men that I document. As
a result, people are largely unaware that many of the arrests undergone by Black
men are deemed by prosecutors to not be worth pursuing a conviction. This
conviction disparity makes the argument that differences in arrest rates between
Black and White individuals provide evidence of a higher Black crime rate even
more incorrect and concerning.

163. As discussed in supra Part IV, I find that 50.35% of Black men in the NLSY97 had been arrested as
an adult at least once as of 2017.
164. See generally BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006) (discussing the
closely related prison boom’s impact on inequality in the United States).
165. See Mark Theoharis, How a Criminal Record Affects Your Finances & Your Life, MONEY CRASHERS,
https://www.moneycrashers.com/criminal-record-affects-finances-life (last updated Mar. 21, 2022).
166. See Benjamin D. Geffen, The Collateral Consequences of Acquittal: Employment Discrimination on
the Basis of Arrests without Convictions, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 81, 81 (2017).
167. See Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Gender, Race, and Urban Policing: The Experience of African
American Youths, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 531, 533 (2006).
168. For example, Virginia has a state law that provides employment protection for individuals who take
time off of work because they are required to be in court, either as a jury member or because they are summoned
or subpoenaed. However, the law explicitly excludes criminal defendants. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–465.1
(West 2005).
169. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 841 (2015).
170. NATAPOFF, supra note 160, at 167 (“Historian Khalil Gibran Muhammad explains that the very idea
of a ‘black crime rate’ has undermined the social and political status of African Americans since the Civil War.”).
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CONCLUSION
This Article is the first to look at racial disparities in conviction rates for a
nationally representative sample of arrests for all crime types in the United
States. I find a large disparity of 29% in comparing Black and White male
arrestees’ conviction rates, with Black men being convicted at lower rates than
White men. Further, this disparity is concentrated in crimes for which police
typically have high levels of discretion in the arrest decision. Low conviction
rates for Black men thus likely reflect over-arrest among the Black population,
raising cause for concern.
Each arrest is psychologically and financially costly to the arrestee,
cultivates lasting stigma directed at the arrestee and limits their future labor
market opportunities, costs taxpayer money in the form of policing budgets, and
increases the likelihood of police violence. To the extent that Black men are
being arrested for crimes that prosecutors do not ultimately pursue, policing
practices that disproportionately target Black men waste government resources
and create problematic arrest records that limit social mobility.
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APPENDIX
A. DESCRIPTION OF REGRESSION ANALYSES
I perform regression analyses on three main outcomes: arrests (per year),
convictions (per arrest), and incarcerations (per conviction). I limit my analyses
to adult men, so respondents only enter the analysis sample after they turn
eighteen.
Table 1 summarizes my sample for each regression equation. Regression
(2) is the focus of this Article, but I also include results from regressions (1) and
(3) to ensure that the patterns for arrest and sentencing in the NLSY97 reflect
those of prior research. As of the 2017 survey, 1,820 of the 4,453 men in my
sample had been arrested at least once as an adult (approximately 41%).
TABLE A1: DESCRIPTION OF MAIN REGRESSION ANALYSES
(1)
Outcome of
Interest

(1)

(2)

(3)

Arrests

Convictions

Incarcerations

(2)

(3)

(4)

Observation
Level

Dependent
Variable
Description

Number of
observations
(Adult Men)

IndividualYear (it)

0 if respondent i is not
arrested in year t
1 if respondent i is
arrested in year t

Arrests (a)

0 if arrest a does not
result in conviction
1 if arrest a results in
conviction

Convictions (c)

0 if conviction c
results in noncustodial
sentence
1 if conviction c
results in custodial
sentence

53,491
- 562
(missing arrest
data)
52,929
5,450 arrests
- 491 (missing
charge data)
- 370 (missing
conviction data)
4,589
2,271
convictions
- 204 (missing
sentencing data)
2,067

My main regression equation is as follows:
𝑌𝑗=1,2,3 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Yj is an indicator variable for the three sets of outcomes as described in
column (3) of Table 1. α0 is the intercept term. Xit is a vector of individual, timevarying characteristics (e.g., census region where currently residing), while Zi is
a vector of individual, time-invariant characteristics (e.g., race/ethnicity). γt is a
set of year fixed effects that captures overall time trends.

May 2022

MASS CRIMINALIZATION AND RACIAL DISPARITIES

1131

The individual error term is represented by ui , and εit is the random error
term. εit captures random variation over time, while ui captures all unobserved,
time-invariant characteristics of individual i that impact outcome Y.
1. Explanatory Variables
My coefficients of interest are those associated with the variables for
race/ethnicity (contained in vector Zi ). The NLSY directly asks respondents one
question about race and one about ethnicity.171 The survey then combines these
two variables into a single category for race/ethnicity, consisting of Black,
Hispanic, Mixed Race (Non-Hispanic), and Non-Black/Non-Hispanic.172 For
race/ethnicity, I generally follow the NLSY-created variable for race/ethnicity,
with one exception. While the NLSY’s Non-Black/Non-Hispanic category
contains “White,” “Asian or Pacific Islander,” and “American Indian, Eskimo,
or Aleut” individuals,173 I separate White individuals from the other two
categories. Ultimately, I have four mutually exclusive indicator variables for
Black, Hispanic, White, and other race. The category for other race includes
respondents marked as Mixed Race (Non-Hispanic), “Asian or Pacific Islander,”
and “American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut.” Because of the small sample size (143
male respondents), I exclude anyone in the other race category from my analysis.
In my regressions, I include indicator variables for Black and Hispanic, while
White is the omitted reference group. Thus, my race/ethnicity regression
coefficients indicate how each racial/ethnic group compares to their White
counterparts.
Because the NLSY has a vast array of information on each individual
respondent, I can observe and control for many characteristics that may be
associated with criminal justice outcomes. To isolate the relationship between
race/ethnicity and criminal justice outcomes, I control for other observable
characteristics that may be correlated with race and impact an individual’s
criminal justice outcomes.
Xit (Zi ) is a vector of time-variant (time-invariant) characteristics that are
likely to predict criminal justice processing outcomes. Geographic
characteristics within Xit include an indicator variable for whether the
respondent lives in a high-risk neighborhood174 and mutually exclusive indicator
variables for whether the respondent lives in the Southern, North Central, or
Western regions (with the Northeastern region as the reference group). Age at
the beginning of the survey is included in Zi . I include this as a time-invariant
variable rather than age each year because of the close correlation between age
and year, which I control for in the year fixed effects, γt .
171. Race, Ethnicity & Citizenship, NAT’L LONGITUDINAL SURVS., https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/
cohorts/nlsy97/topical-guide/household/race-ethnicity-citizenship (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Following Mitchell and Caudy, supra note 54, I combine whether the respondent resides in an innercity neighborhood with whether the respondent reports that their neighborhood or school has gangs, creating a
single dichotomous variable that reflects whether an individual lives in a high-risk neighborhood.
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Household characteristics are captured by indicator variables for whether
the individual lives with a spouse or child. Respondents’ labor market status is
captured within Xit by indicator variables for whether the individual was
employed or enrolled in school (either high school or college). I also include an
indicator variable for whether the respondent was a college graduate. I capture
respondents’ financial wellbeing by an indicator variable for whether a
respondent’s family falls below 2x the poverty line. All household, labor market,
education, and financial variables mentioned in this paragraph are measured at
time t-1, to reduce concerns of simultaneity bias.
Within Xit and Zi , I also include a measure of respondents’ likely criminal
activity by including variables that capture their self-reported
criminal/delinquent activity and illegal substance use. Ideally, I would control
for each of these as time-variant variables at each survey date. However, the
NLSY stopped asking questions regarding criminal activity of most respondents
after 2003. Because of the age range of NLSY respondents, the youngest
respondents were eighteen as of their 2003 interview, while the oldest
respondents were twenty-four at the time of their 2003 interview. I therefore
limit my measure of criminality to criminal activity reported prior to age
eighteen, to have a consistent measure of criminality across ages. Because my
analysis is limited to adult men, my variable for delinquency is time-invariant
and is represented in Zi .
The NLSY creates its own delinquency scale that takes on values from 0–
10.175 In 1997, the survey asks respondents ten separate questions about whether
they have engaged in various types of delinquent activities.176 These include:
1.

Have you ever run away, that is, left home and stayed away at least
overnight without your parent’s prior knowledge or permission?

2.

Have you ever carried a hand gun? When we say hand gun, we mean any
firearm other than a rifle or shotgun.

3.

Have you ever belonged to a gang?

4.

Have you ever purposely damaged or destroyed property that did not
belong to you?

5.

Have you ever stolen something from a store or something that did not
belong to you worth less than 50 dollars?

6.

Have you ever stolen something from a store, person or house, or
something that did not belong to you worth 50 dollars or more including
stealing a car?

7.

Have you ever committed other property crimes such as fencing,
receiving, possessing or selling stolen property, or cheated someone by
selling them something that was worthless or worth much less than what
you said it was?

175. CHILD TRENDS, INC. & CTR. FOR HUM. RES. RSCH. OHIO STATE UNIV., NLSY97 CODEBOOK
SUPPLEMENT MAIN FILE ROUND 1, at 150 (1999).
176. Id. at 149.
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8.

Have you ever attacked someone with the idea of seriously hurting them
or have a situation end up in a serious fight or assault of some kind?

9.

Have you ever sold or helped sell marijuana (pot, grass), hashish (hash)
or other hard drugs such as heroin, cocaine or LSD?
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10.Have you ever been arrested by the police or taken into custody for an
illegal or delinquent offense (do not include arrests for minor traffic
violations)?177

The NLSY then sums the number of questions that respondents answered
yes to, creating a discrete variable that can take on values 0–10.178 In follow up
surveys, this same variable is created, except the questions change from “have
you ever” to “since the last interview date,” have you.179 Rather than use one
value of this measure in a single survey year, I combine respondents’ answers to
these questions up through age eighteen to create a similar, cross-year
delinquency measure. I exclude juvenile arrests from this measure, as this
measure is subject to the same selection concerns as adult arrests, rather than
directly reflecting delinquent activity. My ultimate delinquency measure reflects
the number of the above-listed activities (0–9) that an individual respondent
reports having engaged in prior to the survey in which he turned eighteen.
For drug use, I include indicator variables for whether the individual used
marijuana or hard drugs at time t-1. Finally, I include a variable for the number
of arrests the respondent had experienced at the time of arrest to capture the
effects of a criminal record.
2. Panel Data Considerations
The data I am using are panel data, meaning that each respondent is
interviewed multiple times, and the N observations in my dataset are made up of
t = (1, 2, . . . , T) observations across i = (1, 2, . . . I) individuals. The panel
nature of the NLSY data is useful because it allows for examination of both
between-individual and within-individual variations.180 This means that I can
study the between-individual relationship between race and criminal justice
outcomes—as I would be able to do using cross-sectional data—while also
gaining the added benefit of being able to study within-individual impact of
characteristics that vary over time.
Another benefit of panel data over cross-sectional data is the ability to
account for some omitted variables that might otherwise introduce bias in a
standard regression analysis. By using panel data, researchers can control for
177. Id.
178. Id. at 150.
179. See, e.g., Round 1 Questionnaire, NAT’L LONGITUDINAL SURV., https://www.nlsinfo.org/sites/default/
files/attachments/121128/nlsy97r1ysaq.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2021) (“Have you ever belonged to a gang?”);
Round 2 Questionnaire, NAT’L LONGITUDINAL SURV., https://www.nlsinfo.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
130411/nlsy97r2saqquex.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2021) (“Have you been a member of a gang since the last
interview date on [date of last interview]?”).
180. See Andrew Bell & Kelvyn Jones, Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series
Cross-Sectional and Panel Data, 3 POL. SCI. RSCH. & METHODS 133, 137 (2015).
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unobserved, time-invariant factors (represented by ui in my equations outlined
above), reducing concerns of omitted variables bias.181 An example of a
potential omitted variable is parental criminal justice contact—a measure not
included in the NLSY—which may influence a respondent’s knowledge and
perception of the criminal justice system and impact likelihood of conviction.
The most basic means to achieve this goal is the use of a fixed-effects
regression model. The fixed-effects model treats ui as a time-invariant,
individual-specific effect, which is netted out in the estimation. 182 An important
strength of fixed-effects estimation is that no assumptions about the correlation
between ui and the right-hand-side variables is required for the estimator to be
unbiased and consistent.183
An alternate regression model used in panel data analysis is that of random
effects. The random effects model requires stronger assumptions about the
underlying data than the fixed effects model.184 Namely, the random effects
model assumes that the individual error term, ui , is a set of random variables
that follows a specified probability distribution.185 Most important is that
consistent estimation of a random effects model requires that ui be uncorrelated
with the right-hand-side variables.186
While the fixed effects estimator does not require that the individual effect
ui be uncorrelated with the right-hand-side variables,187 it also comes with one
major drawback. Fixed effects regressions eliminate the ability to estimate the
coefficient on any time-invariant characteristic.188 Given that the relationship
between race/ethnicity—a time-invariant characteristic—and criminal justice
outcomes is my question of interest, I am unable to use a fixed-effects model.
The random-effects model also proves potentially problematic because of the
assumption I must make that ui is independent of Xit and Zi .189
One can test whether the more stringent assumptions of a random-effects
model are appropriate by comparing the results from a fixed-effects model with
a random-effects model. This is done using a Hausman test.190 If the Hausman
test reveals that the time-variant coefficients resulting from each model are
sufficiently similar, one can assume that the results from the random-effects
model are consistent.191 However, if the Hausman test reveals that the
coefficients from each model are sufficiently different, it indicates that the
181. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 255–
56 (2001).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. PAUL D. ALLISON, FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION MODELS 21–22 (2009).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 21.
189. WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 181, at 288 (“[T]he key consideration in choosing between a random effects
and fixed effects approach is whether [ui] and Xit are correlated.”).
190. ALLISON, supra note 184, at 23; WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 181, at 288–89.
191. Badi H. Baltagi, Georges Bresson & Alain Pirotte, Fixed Effects, Random Effects, or Hausman-Taylor?
A Pretest Estimator, 79 ECONOMETRIC LETTERS 361, 362 (2003).
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random-effects model is biased and that the fixed-effects results should be
preferred.192
After running each model and using a Hausman test, I find that the
traditional random-effects model is biased. This is problematic due to the fixedeffects model’s inability to estimate my coefficient of interest. As such, I use an
alternate model: random effects with a Hausman-Taylor correction.193 This is
known as a “hybrid” model, as it seeks to incorporate the benefits of the fixedeffects model (relaxed assumptions) with the benefits of the random-effects
model (ability to estimate the coefficient on time-invariant characteristics).194
The Hausman-Taylor estimator uses an instrumental variables approach.195
I outline the steps of the H-T process below:196
1.

Split the right-hand-side variables into four categories: time-variant
exogenous (X1it ), time-variant endogenous (X 2it ), time-invariant
exogenous (Z1i ), and time-invariant endogenous (Z2i ). These
groupings are based on theoretical assumptions, where X1it and Z1i
are assumed to be uncorrelated with both ui and εit , and X 2it and Z2i
are assumed to be uncorrelated with εit but may be correlated with
ui . Thus, my regression equation (1) from above becomes:
𝑌𝑗 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1 𝑍1𝑖 + 𝛿2 𝑍2𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

2.
3.
4.

5.

Use a within-effects estimator to consistently estimate the fixed
effects coefficients β̂1 and β̂2 .
Use these estimates to obtain within residuals, d̂i .
Regress d̂i on Z1i and Z2i , using X1it and Z1i as instruments. This
regression provides intermediate, consistent estimators, δ̂1IV and
δ̂2IV .
Use β̂1 , β̂2 , δ̂1IV , and δ̂2IV to obtain an estimate of σ2u, an estimate of
the variance of the individual random error effect.

6.

Perform a standard random-effects GLS transform on each variable.

7.

Fit an instrumental-variables regression of the GLS transformed
variables.

I make the following assumptions about endogeneity of the right-hand-side
variables:
• Exogenous, time variant variables (X1it ): Year indicators, region indicators
• Endogenous, time variant variables (X 2it ): Indicator for living below 2x the
poverty line, indicator for enrolled in school, indicator for college
graduate, indicator for employed, indicators for hard drug and marijuana
192. Id.
193. See generally Jerry A. Hausman & William E. Taylor, Panel Data and Unobservable Individual
Effects, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1377 (1981).
194. See Reinhard Schunck, Within and Between Estimates in Random-Effects Models: Advantages and
Drawbacks of Correlated Random Effects and Hybrid Models, 13 STATA J. 65, 67 (2013).
195. Baltagi et al., supra note 191, at 361.
196. STATACORP, STATA LONGITUDINAL-DATA/PANEL-DATA REFERENCE MANUAL: RELEASE 13, at 167–
79 (2013).
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use, indicator for living in a high-risk neighborhood, and number of prior
arrests
• Exogenous, time invariant variables (Z1i ): Race/ethnicity indicators
• Endogenous, time invariant variables (Z2i ): Measure of delinquency

B. RESULTS
1. Main Regressions
Regression analysis is important to determine whether the raw disparities
reflect underlying differences between racial and ethnic groups in other
characteristics that might be legally relevant for case processing. Columns (1),
(2), and (3) of Appendix Table B.I report my results from the Hausman-Taylor
specification for the outcomes of arrested per survey period, convicted per arrest,
and incarcerated per conviction, respectively.
Those with a higher delinquency index, based on self-reported
delinquent activity as juveniles, are significantly more likely to be arrested and
incarcerated. These results lend support for these self-reported measures being
valid proxies for an individual’s actual criminal behavior as an adult. Other than
the indicator for Black and Hispanic, the only other statistically significant
predictor of conviction is whether the respondent is a college graduate. The fact
that arrestees with college degrees are less likely to be convicted may reflect
prosecutors’, judges’, and juries’ perceptions that these individuals are less
likely to commit future crimes or are less blameworthy for the crimes they have
been arrested for.
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APPENDIX TABLE B.I:
LIKELIHOOD OF ARREST, CONVICTION, AND INCARCERATION
(1)
Arrest
(Per Year)
Black
Hispanic
Delinquency Index
Southern Region
North Central Region
Western Region
High Risk Neighborhood
Household Below 2x Poverty Line
Spouse in Household
Child in Household
Enrolled in School
Employed
College Graduate
Hard Drug User
Marijuana User
Number of Prior Arrests197

0.067***
(0.009)
0.013
(0.008)
0.049***
(0.015)
0.001
(0.008)
0.023**
(0.009)
0.011
(0.009)
0.021***
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.018***
(0.004)
-0.018***
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.021***
(0.005)
0.038***
(0.008)
0.017***
(0.005)
-0.083***

(2)
Conviction
(Per Arrest)
-0.157***
(0.028)
-0.072**
(0.031)
0.002
(0.019)
-0.044
(0.033)
0.015
(0.033)
-0.017
(0.034)
-0.047
(0.046)
0.022
(0.029)
-0.070
(0.055)
-0.053
(0.042)
-0.002
(0.040)
-0.048
(0.032)
-0.222*
(0.126)
-0.027
(0.037)
0.022
(0.030)
0.000

(3)
Incarceration
(Per Conviction)
0.228***
(0.048)
0.229***
(0.051)
0.099***
(0.038)
0.092*
(0.055)
0.083
(0.053)
0.032
(0.058)
-0.036
(0.070)
-0.001
(0.038)
0.106
(0.085)
-0.115*
(0.067)
-0.107*
(0.065)
0.000
(0.054)
0.193
(0.179)
0.075
(0.060)
-0.039
(0.048)
0.013

197. It may appear odd that having a more extensive arrest record yields lower arrest and rates. However,
this result can be explained by the nature of the regression. The Hausman-Taylor regression coefficients on timevariant variables reflect the within variation for individual respondents, and not the variation between different
respondents. When comparing between two respondents—one with a prior arrest and one without—it is true that
the individual who has been arrested in the past is more likely to be arrested in a future period. However, when
comparing the variation within individuals who are ultimately arrested, the likelihood of future arrest decreases
with each arrest, since not all individuals who are arrested once will be rearrested in the future.
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(0.004)

(0.006)

(0.010)

50,540
4,304

4,388
1,631

1,963
1,036

All values are calculated using the NLSY sample weights. https://www.nlsinfo.org/
weights/nlsy97. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Controls for age (in 1997) and survey year
(at time t) are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note that
sample observations do not match exactly to those in Appendix Table B.I due to some
missing data in explanatory variables.

2. Main Regressions (Including Charge Type)
One possible explanation for the lower conviction rate for Black
individuals is that they are arrested for different types of crimes than White
individuals—namely, crimes that are less likely to result in a conviction. To
check this, I estimate regressions that also include charge type.
The regressions in Appendix Table B.II take the same form as my main
regressions, with two changes. First, I add a vector of indicator variables, Wc ,
on the right-hand side of the equation. Wc is a vector of indicator variables that
captures the type of crime the individual was charged with, as this is highly
likely to impact conviction outcome. The charges are not mutually exclusive, in
that an individual can report multiple charges for a single arrest.
Second, because I do not have data on the type of charge unless the
individual was charged with a crime, my outcome is limited to conviction
conditional on charging (as opposed to conviction conditional on arrest in
Appendix Table B.I).
Including charge type does not eliminate the racial effect, indicating that
my results on conviction and incarceration are not explained by systematic
differences in the types of crimes Black and White individuals are arrested for.
The magnitude of my result in this regression is smaller than in my main
regression (11 percentage points as compared with 16 percentage points). This
result is expected, given that this regression is limited to individuals who are
charged with a crime and thus does not capture any racial disparity in the original
charging decision. This regression does, however, eliminate the ethnicity effect
on conviction.
The coefficients on likelihood of conviction by charge type align with a
recent report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) on conviction rates of
felony defendants.198 The BJS reported that in 2018, felony defendants
originally charged with assault were the least likely to ultimately be convicted
(45%) and that those charged with motor-vehicle theft (74%), driving-related
offenses (73%), murder (70%), and burglary (69%) were the most likely to be
convicted. While the NLSY97 also includes misdemeanors and does not have
198. What is the Probability of Conviction for Felony Defendants?, BUREAU JUST. STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=403 [https://web.archive.org/web/20210318125307/
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=403] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
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separate charging categories for motor-vehicle theft or murder,199 my
coefficients generally align with the report. I find a relatively lower conviction
likelihood for those charged with assault, which aligns with it being the lowest
conviction rate for felony defendants, and I find relatively higher conviction
likelihoods for those charged with burglary and driving-related offenses, which
aligns with those crimes being among the four highest conviction rates for felony
defendants.
APPENDIX TABLE B.II
LIKELIHOOD OF CONVICTION, CONDITIONAL ON CHARGING
(CONTROLLING FOR CHARGE TYPE)
(1)
Conviction
Black
Hispanic
Delinquency Index
Southern Region
North Central Region
Western Region
High Risk Neighborhood
Household Below 2x Poverty Line
Spouse in Household
Child in Household
Enrolled in School
Employed
College Graduate
Hard Drug User
Marijuana User

199. See supra Part IV.

-0.114***
(0.031)
-0.023
(0.032)
-0.016
(0.018)
-0.004
(0.034)
0.070**
(0.033)
0.062*
(0.036)
-0.070
(0.050)
0.038
(0.028)
-0.077
(0.062)
-0.044
(0.046)
-0.017
(0.046)
-0.056
(0.037)
-0.127
(0.147)
0.010
(0.038)
-0.034
(0.032)
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Number of Prior Arrests
Charged with Assault
Charged with Burglary
Charged with Robbery
Charged with Theft
Charged with Destruction of Property
Charged with Other Property Crime
Charged with Drug Possession
Charged with Drug Sale
Charged with Major Traffic Offense
Charged with Public Disorder
Charge with Other Crime

Observations
Number of Respondents

Vol. 73:4

0.009
(0.006)
-0.064**
(0.032)
0.102**
(0.040)
0.060
(0.044)
0.009
(0.041)
0.010
(0.045)
0.004
(0.046)
0.061**
(0.029)
0.060
(0.040)
0.095***
(0.024)
0.043
(0.032)
-0.002
(0.026)
3,092
1,320

All values are calculated using the NLSY sample weights. https://www.nlsinfo.org/
weights/nlsy97. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Controls for age (in 1997) and survey
year (at time t) are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

3. First Arrest Only Analysis
To determine whether higher rates of active probation or parole among
Black men could be driving the results, I perform a supplemental analysis that
includes first arrests only. The results of this analysis are presented in Appendix
Table B.III. I find that a large disparity persists in these first-time arrests, with
Black arrestees being 14 percentage points less likely to be convicted. These
results indicate that differing parole or probation rates by race are not driving
the results.
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APPENDIX TABLE B.III
LIKELIHOOD OF CONVICTION: FIRST ARREST ONLY
(1)
Conviction
Black
Hispanic
Delinquency Index
Southern Region
North Central Region
Western Region
High Risk Neighborhood
Household Below 2x Poverty Line
Spouse in Household
Child in Household
Enrolled in School
Employed
College Graduate
Hard Drug User
Marijuana User

Observations

-0.141***
(0.032)
-0.106***
(0.035)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.048
(0.037)
0.015
(0.039)
-0.016
(0.042)
-0.029
(0.036)
0.006
(0.027)
-0.006
(0.071)
-0.070
(0.053)
-0.049
(0.030)
-0.011
(0.032)
-0.039
(0.076)
0.033
(0.041)
0.015
(0.028)
1,902

All values are calculated using the NLSY sample weights. https://www.nlsinfo.org/
weights/nlsy97. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Controls for age (in 1997) and survey
year (at time t) are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

4. Crimes Split by Discretion Level
Finally, the results in Appendix Table B.IV present my regression analysis,
with the sample split by the type of crime charged in the arrest. The racial
disparity is concentrated in high-discretion crimes, with no difference in
conviction rates between Black and White arrestees in low-discretion crimes.
Also notable is the statistically significant coefficient on the variable for
financial wellbeing (2x below the poverty line), which indicates that those
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falling 2x below the federal poverty line are 13 percentage points more likely to
be convicted than their counterparts.
APPENDIX TABLE B.IV
LIKELIHOOD OF CONVICTION: HIGH- AND LOW-DISCRETION CRIMES
(1)
High-Discretion
Crimes
Black
Hispanic
Delinquency Index
Southern Region
North Central Region
Western Region
High Risk Neighborhood
Household Below 2x Poverty Line
Spouse in Household
Child in Household
Enrolled in School
Employed
College Graduate
Hard Drug User
Marijuana User
Number of Prior Arrests
Charged with Assault
Charged with Burglary

-0.157***
(0.056)
-0.029
(0.058)
0.013
(0.030)
-0.001
(0.056)
0.043
(0.057)
0.055
(0.057)
0.065
(0.114)
0.130***
(0.047)
-0.131
(0.121)
0.097
(0.089)
0.007
(0.069)
0.014
(0.057)
-0.261
(0.332)
-0.043
(0.062)
-0.009
(0.053)
0.011
(0.012)

(2)
Low-Discretion
Crimes
-0.079
(0.066)
-0.030
(0.076)
0.028
(0.062)
0.115
(0.075)
0.218**
(0.101)
0.208**
(0.092)
-0.170*
(0.089)
-0.030
(0.104)
-0.482*
(0.273)
-0.111
(0.132)
-0.208**
(0.093)
-0.029
(0.087)
0.239
(0.299)
0.079
(0.096)
-0.045
(0.069)
-0.003
(0.017)
-0.054
(0.067)
0.107
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(0.074)
0.119
(0.077)
0.030
(0.053)
0.002
(0.059)
0.034
(0.066)

Charged with Robbery
Charged with Theft
Charged with Destruction of Property
Charged with Other Property Crime
Charged with Drug Possession
Charged with Drug Sale
Charged with Major Traffic Offense
Charged with Public Disorder

Observations
Number of Respondents
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-0.046
(0.058)
-0.024
(0.061)
0.031
(0.046)
0.008
(0.059)
1,324
791

646
453

All values are calculated using the NLSY sample weights. https://www.nlsinfo.org/
weights/nlsy97. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Controls for age (in 1997) and survey year
(at time t) are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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